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BOOK REVIEWS.

VALUATION: ITS NATURE AND LAWS. Being an Introduction to the General Theory of Value. By Wilbur Marshall Urban, Ph. D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1909. Pp. xviii, 432.

We have here for the first time a considerable work in English upon that subject of value which has engaged so much attention in Germany. It must be a difficult matter for the writer of such a book to decide how much knowledge he may suppose his readers to possess, and whether he ought to write a text-book for them or set forth advanced study and original research. I may perhaps be typical of a good many English readers of Professor Urban's book in that it has formed for me my first introduction to the subject, and to my mind he has made an excellent compromise. If I have found some of the sections rather difficult and a few of them a little easy, I have remembered how hard the compromise must be to make, and wondered that there were not more such parts. The matter of the book is that of a learned work in the best sense. It is written by one who obviously knows his subject, and even when the pages are difficult and seem obscure, the reader has strong reason to believe that there is clear and solid thought behind.

The ground seems to be covered very thoroughly. We have first to discuss what valuation consists of, and that involves an examination of the nature of feeling and its relation to will. The treatment of this subject strikes me as one of the best parts of the book. Professor Urban's special points are two. (1) Some writers say that valuation is a matter of feeling, and some that it is a matter of will, of 'intensity-less acts of preference,' the accompaniment of feeling being irrelevant (p. 76). But discussions of this point are misleading if they assume too hard a division between feeling and will. If we admit that feeling when it rises above the level of mere sensation-tone may have other qualities besides hedonic intensity,—may, for instance, have the attribute of restlessness or quiescence,—then there is no particular reason for separating it from conation-consciousness. In that case emotion will be only "a shortened form of desire and

volition, in which organic largely takes the place of motor sensitivity" (pp. 103 *f.*). Valuation can then be taken to be a matter of feeling, without our falling into the great mistake of supposing it to vary with hedonic vividness. Hedonic resonance may become as insignificant in the developed feeling as imagery in the developed concept. (2) The whole matter cannot be explained in terms of conscious experience alone; we cannot describe it without bringing in the notion of dispositions. These may be called either conative or affective. "What distinguishes the phases which are predominately affective from those predominately conative is the degree of inhibition" of the tendency concerned (p. 94).

We arrive, then, at the description: "Worth experience is a concrete feeling-attitude, in which conation is always present and conative dispositions always presupposed" (p. 93). Such feelings will have a logic and development of their own. Hedonic excitement may shrink and fall into the background as imagery falls back in thought, till what is left is nothing but an 'affective sign.' Nevertheless this affective sign, this "relatively intensity-less appreciation" may have the full funded meaning of what went before (p. 112). Again, we have not only this liberation from hedonic excitement, but liberation from bondage to actual fact. Our valuation may rest on assumptions as well as on presuppositions and on judgment; we may assign values to what is not actually there.

Side by side with this development of value-feeling, we have the development of valued objects. On the lowest level we have the objects of simple appreciation, 'condition worths.' Above these come such qualities and dispositions as we value in persons; the transition presupposing an elaborate process of *Einfühlung*, of knowing others and so coming to know ourselves. Beginning from primitive organic sympathy with others, we rise to that power of intellectual construction which enables their dispositions and feelings to become objects to us; and thence, further, we rise to such intelligent participation of feeling as gives us our third level of value-objects, 'over-individual' worths.

In all these departments we have next to study the special laws which govern our valuation,—laws 'of the threshold,' 'of diminishing values,' 'of complementary values,' 'of contrast,' 'of the total series,' 'of end feelings.' [To find names for psychological facts is a difficult business, and no doubt the author

is hampered by German nomenclature already established, but the constant introduction of technical terms will give some trouble to unpractised readers, here and throughout the book.] 'Value movements' are carefully studied. We are shown the way in which our affections transfer themselves from end to means and from means to end, and also to new objects or aspects which emerge in the course of the processes directed toward the primary object. We may begin by seeking an object, and end by aiming rather at the constant disposition to seek it, the activity of seeking it, or the hedonic accompaniments. A simple appreciation may deepen its reference to that larger system of meanings vaguely presupposed which constitutes its 'trans-gredient reference,' and may so become a sense of obligation, or instead it may deepen its 'immanental reference,' and so become æsthetic in nature. Chapters IX to XII are devoted to a very careful and detailed description of our ways of valuing personal and over-individual worths. The description is often fresh, thoughtful, and interesting, but sometimes the author seems to give overmuch space and care to explaining matters which are not particularly hard to understand.

The last chapter of the book, on the other hand, I have found extremely difficult. The author touches here on the question of the possibility of a coherent philosophy of values. As far as I understand it, his discussion seems to me to be convincing and good. The test of validity suggested is the "inner identity and continuity of the will with its objects or with itself."

Professor Urban is a useful guide because he refers so constantly to the chief writers on his subject. He manages these references admirably, making them full enough to show clearly what the author means, and seeming always to be fair-minded and non-partisan.

The book deserves sincere praise. It is, as I have said, learned, thoughtful, and fair, and a valuable addition to the English version of philosophy. Having said this with all my heart, I am bound to add that never did I meet a valuable book on an interesting subject which was so hard to read. I have constantly read sentences again and again without getting anything from them,—not because they were obscure, but because I failed entirely to keep my attention upon them. At intervals of some weeks I tried three times to read the first chapter, and three times gave it up. I find it hard to say what the exact

reason is. As far as I can make out, the unusual length of most of the sentences, and their lack of rhythm, have something to do with it; perhaps also the great number of technical terms, and of long words and Latin forms. It will be a pity if these obstacles prevent students from getting through the book. If they do get through, they will be glad to have read it, even if they are also glad to have finished reading it.

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SIX RADICAL THINKERS. By J. MacCunn. London: Edward Arnold, 1907. Pp. 268.

Professor MacCunn's book consists of appreciations of Bentham, Mill, Cobden, Carlyle, Mazzini, and Green. To each of the six is given a study of some forty pages,—sympathetic, intimate, and only critical (when it is critical) with that immanent criticism, if it may be so called, which, applying no external hard canon, seeks to elicit the measure of truth contained in every view discussed, and never to prove an error without also proving that the error is an exaggeration of some truth. The study of Mill is a model of such criticism. Instead of taking Mill as a mere target of criticism,—a facile process in the case of a writer so honestly inconsistent, and one to which the logic of the schools is a little over-prone,—Professor MacCunn seeks always to “fashion his character from the heart outwards,” and to enter first into Mill's thought, before he enters the lists against his errors. One thing only has struck the reviewer during a recent reading of Mill, which Professor MacCunn might perhaps have emphasized; and that is the sense of the spiritual foundations of society and its institutions which Mill, starting from a different point of view, nevertheless shares with T. H. Green. When Mill writes that “politically speaking, a great part of all power consists in will”; when he urges that the first element of good government is “the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community”; when he defends democracy for the intellectual and moral development of the individual which it brings; he is after all enforcing the lessons which Green afterwards enforced, when he too taught that will, not force, is the basis of the state;